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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical demonstration for a practical approach of e-
ciency evaluation against the background of limited data availability in some regulated
industries. Here, traditional DEA may result in a lack of discriminatory power when
high numbers of variables but only limited observations are available. We apply PCA-
DEA for radial eciency measurement to US natural gas transmission companies in
2007. This allows us to reduce dimensions of the optimization problem while maintain-
ing most of the variation in the original data. Our results suggest that the PCA-DEA
methodology reduces the probability of over-estimation of the individual rm-specic
performance. It also allows for a large number of original variables without substantially
reducing the discriminatory power of the model.
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11 Introduction
Natural gas transmission is a typical network industry. Theoretical (Sharkey 1982) and
empirical evidence (Gordon et al. 2003) underline the subadditivity in the cost structure
and therefore gas transmission companies remain highly regulated. The purpose of this
paper is to provide empirical evidence of a robust benchmarking technique for regulation
when the number of regulated companies and/or data observations is small.
Since the late 1980s a substantial reform process was undertaken with the objectives of
cost reductions and eciency increases in regulated network industries. The transition from
cost-plus regulation, where companies recover their costs with a xed rate of return (Joskow
2006; Farsi et al. 2007) to incentive-based regulation is the latest development towards
more ecient production and cost reduction. In an incentive-based regulatory framework,
price and revenue caps are set based on the RPI-X formula (Littlechild 1983; Beesley and
Littlechild 1989) where the determination of the expected eciency savings (X) is usually
based on empirical results obtained from sophisticated eciency analysis approaches (also
called benchmarking analyses). This framework, where the eciency performance of the
companies is evaluated against a reference performance (Farsi et al. 2005), has mainly been
favored by European regulators and played a crucial role in the regulatory processes in the
UK and the Nordic countries.
Using benchmarking methods in regulatory practice has been widely criticized (Shut-
tleworth 2005, 2003). One of the major criticisms is the low number of observations in this
sector, for a robust and consistent benchmarking. As shown in Table 1 the low number of
observations is caused by strong concentration and absence of competition in natural gas
transmission (for Germany see e.g. Hirschhausen et al. (2007)). In fact, in most of the
European countries, e.g., Finland and Belgium, a single transmission company is operating.
In others, e.g., Spain, Sweden and Austria, several independent companies are operating. In
Germany, for the rst round of determining eciency scores data on only 8 companies (due
to legislation) are considered in the benchmarking procedure. Moreover, the regulator often
collects data on a yearly basis, thus additionally restricting sample size. Hence, both the
low number of companies and the yearly data basis severely limit sample size for a serious
application of traditional benchmarking methods. Regulators of natural gas transmission
system operators require guidance in adapting their models to the empirical challenges.
A possible solution to expand the number of observations is to use data from other
countries found in international benchmarking exercises. The study CEER (2006) analyzes
relative eciencies of European natural gas transmission operators. Its sample consists of
four European countries (one company each, covering dierent time spans (3-5 years)) and
43 US companies over 9 years. However, two major problems with international compar-
isons are the strong heterogeneity of rms and the dierences in data denitions across
countries. Europe has the added problems that data collection still remains a responsi-
bility of national regulators and a harmonized consistent European data pool is not yet
implemented. Hence, eorts are predominantly undertaken to establish national eciency
standards with a limited data sample that consolidate theoretical requirements and practi-
cal applicability.
A wide range of benchmarking approaches and frameworks exist in the literature (Ja-
masb and Pollitt 2001, 2003; Farsi et al. 2007) and the approaches can be separated into
two main streams: nonparametric and parametric methods. Data Envelopment Analysis
2(DEA) as a nonparametric approach and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as a paramet-
ric framework are the most commonly used. The nonparametric methods determine the
reference technology by means of linear programming methods whereas the parametric SFA
assumes a functional relationship for the production process and determines the reference
technology based on econometric methods. From a practical regulatory point of view both
approaches have been useful to regulators: directly as part of the regulation process or as
an additional control instrument for decision-making (Farsi et al. 2007). Both methods
dier in their requirements for the underlying data volume in order to derive meaningful
results.1 Even if DEA, in terms of statistical properties, is more inecient practical expe-
rience shows that DEA is used more frequently than SFA in the practical applications of
eciency analysis in the energy sectors, see Haney and Pollitt (2009); CEER (2006).
A further empirical challenge is that in regulatory practice a detailed benchmarking
model, describing the production process by means of exact input and output variables of
the rms is indispensable. Hence, the model should include as much relevant information
as possible. This requires a reasonable number of observations to distinguish companies
and derive meaningful results. However, given a pre-determined sample size, an increase
in dimensions (i.e. more explanatory variables)|which might contribute to more appro-
priately modeling of reality|leads to fewer observations determining the eciency frontier
and therefore, to less information used to build it. This subsequently aects eciency scores
in nonparametric eciency analysis. For example, utility regulation is often conducted on
a yearly basis, making it impossible to increase sample size when all possible installations
are already included in the sample. Hence, this practical obstacle often constrains the
regulator's ability to meet the statistical requirements. However, reducing dimensions and
conserving all available information at the same time improves the estimation of technical
eciency in a DEA framework.
A feasible solution is the application of principal components analysis (PCA) in DEA
that reduces dimensions of the original set of variables whilst maintaining the information
on variation of data (Haerdle and Simar 2003). The combination of DEA and PCA was
proposed by Ueda and Hoshiai (1997), and Adler and Golany (2001, 2002) who aim to over-
come the issue of over-estimation of relative eciency due to large numbers of variables in
DEA. They show that PCA can improve discriminatory power in DEA and give more reli-
able eciency measurement in small samples. Fields of application refer mainly to network
industries. Whereas Ueda and Hoshiai (1997) apply their approach to the telecommunica-
tion sector, Adler and Golany (2001) and Adler and Berechman (2001) refer to the airline
industry, and Adler and Golany (2002) to university departments. Adler and Yazhemsky
(2009) provide further theoretical developments and show the applicability of PCA to radial
DEA models when only additive DEA models2 were previously considered.
There are also other discrimination-improving approaches related to DEA. For exam-
ple, Adler and Yazhemsky (2009) compare PCA with the approach of variable reduction
based on partial covariance and nd better performance of PCA. Podinovski and Thanas-
soulis (2007) controvert simple approaches, i.e. increasing the number of units and reducing
the number of variables by means of aggregation or reduction, and more sophisticated ap-
1Simar and Wilson (2008) prove that the theoretical foundations of DEA are based on large datasets
to produce meaningful results. By contrast, parametric approaches reveal a desirable feature in terms of
consistency of the estimator, i.e. its convergence to the unknown parameter at a certain rate when sample
size increases to innity.
2For the dierence between radial and additive models see Cooper et al. (2007).
3proaches, where the latter can be grouped using additional information and additional mea-
surements respectively. Additional measurements obtained by means of further treatment of
data have an advantage over additional information. They do not require information that
is not directly given by the data and that is often dicult to determine. Frequently, regu-
lators are unable to identify more realistic proles of an optimal mix of inputs and outputs
that could be implemented in DEA by weight restrictions (Podinovski and Thanassoulis
2007). Weight restrictions modify the ecient boundary of the production possibility set
such that unrealistic input-output-compositions are no longer used as reference. However,
the PCA-DEA formulation causes similar eects without the need of additional information
(Adler and Yazhemsky 2009) and is therefore also preferred for our empirical analysis.
This paper provides the rst PCA-DEA (in terms of radial eciency measurement)
in the context of natural gas transmission regulation. Since European is not easily com-
parable, we use the US natural gas market as our reference model. The US natural gas
market often serves as a reference model given the long and good record of regulatory
experience and publicly available company data over the last three decades. Rather than
potentially including US data in a European benchmarking exercise we use data on US nat-
ural gas transmission companies to illustrate how data limitations aect radial eciency
measurement and how PCA-DEA improves it. For a discussion comparing the US and
European natural gas market see Jamasb et al. (2008). Our contribution to the literature
and practical application is to support a pragmatic approach for European regulators who
predominantly undertake eorts for national benchmarking and therefore face problems of
limited data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces traditional
DEA methodology and describes the issue of small samples in nonparametric benchmarking.
DEA is extended by means of PCA following Adler and Yazhemsky (2009). The model
specications are outlined in Section 3, which also presents the data we use. Within this
section outlier detection is reviewed. Our results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5
concludes.
2 Methodology
DEA is a nonparametric method frequently used in regulatory practice to evaluate relative
eciency and to set company-individual eciency targets subsequently. The reference
technology is not determined by imposing a functional form that describes the production
process or cost structure, but by piecewise linear programming assuming a transformation
of inputs into outputs. However, basic DEA models consider two types of technology:
constant returns to scale (CRS) proposed by Charnes et al. (1978), and variable returns to
scale (VRS) suggested by Banker et al. (1984). The rst translates into strict regulation
practice assuming one optimal rm size whereas the latter allows for scale ineciencies.
We limit ourselves to assume VRS technology because it seems to be more reasonable in
small samples (Adler and Yazhemsky 2009). We also impose input-orientation, meaning
that input is minimized while output remains xed. This is a reasonable and common
assumption in network industries because rms are generally required to supply service
to a xed geographical area, and hence, the output vector is essentially xed (Coelli and
4Walding 2006, p. 59).3
The standard radial DEA environment incorporating VRS technology and minimizing




s.t. Y    sY = Yj
  X   sX = Xj (1)
e = 1
;;sY ;sX  0
where  represents the relative eciency (that is the absolute eciency of the unit
under consideration relative to a maximum value of obtained eciency by any of the units
considered) of each company contained in the set J = f1;2;:::;ng. Xi and Yi are column
vectors of k inputs and l outputs of unit j. Collecting the column vectors yields in a k n
matrix for inputs X and a l  n matrix for outputs Y respectively. The input and output
weights are given by the column vector . The constraint e = 1 ensures that the VRS-
restriction is taken into account.4 The slack variables sX and sY permit the optimization
problem to be of linear form. Furthermore, sX, sY , , and  are supposed to be nonnegative.
To obtain meaningful results with DEA the number of relevant input and output vari-
ables must be in proportion to the number of observations. Regulatory practice demands a
sophisticated model with a high number of inputs and outputs to describe the production
process or cost structure realistically. How well the method is able to suciently dis-
criminate between utilities becomes an issue particularly when the data are limited, which
is a known issue in real regulatory practice. This is addressed by principal components
analysis (PCA), which can be used to reduce dimensions (number of variables) of the opti-
mization problem by means of constructing linear combinations of the original data (Adler
and Golany 2001, 2002). This conversion alters the original coordinate system (Adler and
Yazhemsky 2009). Selecting the number of linear combinations then can reduce the dimen-
sions of the new coordinate system. The number of dimensions comprising this new coordi-
nate system depends on satisfying a selection criterion, e.g., the Kaiser-Guttmann-criterion
or the Jolie-criterion. We follow the study by Adler and Golany (2002) who select two
as the number of principal components that satisfy discrimination purposes. However, we
exclusively consider the limitation of dimensions in terms of outputs since there is no prob-
lem with a single input. Thus, for the purpose of translating output data, the correlation
matrix C is obtained from the output matrix Y with Y = [Y1;Y2;:::;Yl]. The eigenvectors
vl given by C are used to create linear combinations of the form PCYi =
P
l (vl;i  Yl) that
are also known as principal components (PC). Each of the principal components explains
a certain ratio of the original variables' variance, whereby this ratio corresponds to the
eigenvalues of C l. Commonly, eigenvalues are in descending order, and so are therefore
principal components, i.e. PC1 covers most of the variation in the data, PC2 covers less of
it, and PCl covers the lowest proportion.
3Input-orientation can be implemented in parametric and nonparametric approaches. For a parametric
application see for example Farsi et al. (2005).
4Relaxing this constraint yields CRS technology, i.e.   0.
5Here we consider the combination of PCA and radial DEA models according to Adler
and Yazhemsky (2009). However, one drawback of PCA-DEA is its requirement of data
transformation. In PCA-DEA data are transformed initially by PCA and have to be re-
modeled to the original form after optimization. It appears that only some radial DEA
settings are tolerant towards data transformation. Pastor (1996) proves output translation
invariance for input-oriented DEA models under VRS assumption. Hence, in general, the
optimal solution using original data does not change when data are transformed. Although,
translation invariance is not supported by all DEA models, their general properties are not
aected by PCA-DEA, see Adler and Yazhemsky (2009).
For one unmodied input and all outputs to be transformed into principal components,




s.t. YPC   LY sPC = YPC;j
  X   sX = Xj (2)
L 1
Y YPC  sPC
e = 1
;;sPC;sX  0
where Y = [y1;y2;:::;yp] is the matrix of p outputs and x the single input vector we
use. LY is the matrix collecting the output weights obtained by PCA. The original data are
weighted and enter through principal components YPC where YPC = lt
iY = l1iy1 + l2iy2 +
l3iy3+l4iy4 and li are the normalized eigenvectors from the correlation matrix of Y. Because
all outputs are transformed into principal components, the minimization problem does not
include separate output vectors. Both the slack variable sPC and the original output data
are weighted by the linear coecients obtained by PCA.5 As stated in formulation (1) VRS
technology and nonnegativity of parameters and slack variables are assumed. If and only
if all PCs are included, i.e. PCs explain 100% of the original data variation, the solutions
of formulation (1) and (2) are equivalent (Adler and Yazhemsky 2009).
3 Model specication and data
3.1 Model specication
We want to determine the pipelines' relative ability (pipelines refer to companies operating
such facilities) to provide services at least cost where we consider the demand as xed in the
short-term. Hence, the model set up is based on the idea of a cost driver analysis, meaning
that costs are explained by output variables that are relevant to costs of the pipelines under
consideration. This approach deviates from the purely technical representation of the pro-
duction process by physical data but is often applied in regulatory practice, see e.g., CEER
(2006) and Bundesnetzagentur (2006). An important issue that arises almost immediately
5Due to data transformation a new constraint enters the linear problem which ensures the slack variable
to be equal or smaller than the product of inverse weighting matrix and weighted output data.
6when applying benchmarking in regulatory practice, is cost comparability. There are es-
sentially two ways of constructing the benchmarking basis, i.e. the short-run maintenance
model and the long-run service model. For a broad discussion see Burns et al. (2005). The
rst model incorporates operating expenditures while the second model incorporates total
expenditures (operating expenditures plus capital costs). Although the total cost approach
oers some advantages, the evaluation of capital costs still must be conducted carefully and
in a reliable manner. However, in practice regulators more often rely on the rst model
(Haney and Pollitt 2009), and therefore, we conduct our analysis of eciency on the ba-
sis of the short-run maintenance model. The determination of variables to be included is
discussed broadly in the literature. A comprehensive investigation of the variables to use
as cost measures and cost drivers for international benchmarking and regulation purposes
is presented by CEER (2006); Jamasb et al. (2008) examine the productivity development
of US natural gas transmission companies and review the literature with respect to vari-
ables. We note that most of the studies presented in the latter paper rely exclusively on
parametric approaches.
We develop two model settings (Model 1 and Model 2), each containing the same cost
measurement but dier in their number of cost drivers. We select total operating and main-
tenance expenses (OPEX) as the input to be minimized.6 Although there are arguments
in favor of total expenses including capital costs, we do not consider them here. However,
CEER (2006) shows high correlation between these two measurements. The basic model
(Model 1) treats total amount of natural gas delivered (TotDeliv), transmission system
(TransSys), peak deliveries (PeakDeliv), and total installed horsepower of compressor sta-
tions (HorPow) as OPEX determinants and therefore outputs. The second model (Model
2) adds transmission system losses (TransLos), which is an undesired output and therefore
must be treated dierently. It is not our aim to present the particular eect of this unde-
sired output itself; rather, we wish to demonstrate how an additional output will aect the
empirical analysis and therefore regulatory consequences.
For the purpose of demonstration and comparison, each of the two models is specied
under traditional DEA and PCA-DEA methodology, both assuming VRS technology. The
resulting four model specications are listed in Table 2.
3.2 Data
We use data on US American natural gas transmission companies. The US natural gas
industry oers a comprehensive record of publicly available data and regulatory history,
making it ideal for our analysis. We compile data from the US Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC) database of the major interstate natural gas pipelines. This covers
each natural gas company whose combined gas transported or stored for a fee exceed 50
million dekatherms in each of the previous three calendar years (FERC 2008, p. i). In total
our original sample contains 37 US American natural gas transmission companies in 2007
operating only onshore pipelines.7 However, these companies are either stand alone units
or units covering a broader business portfolio (holdings). Table 3 summarizes all variables
we use.
6This is known as OPEX-benchmarking. Haney and Pollitt (2009) list international regulators who in
fact conduct OPEX regulation.
7We omit companies which also operate oshore pipelines since the technology diers.
7The sample includes natural gas transmission pipelines that spend about 2,860 million
USD on operating and maintenance for approximately 127,783 miles of onshore facilities.
This covers about 66.5% of total US interstate pipeline mileage. Pipelines dier in trans-
mission system8 and total deliveries9, ranging from 49.93 million Dekatherms (Dth) to over
6,046 million Dth. The data indicates that some deliver low amounts of gas in peak times10
with a minimum of 0.19 million Dth, while others deliver up to the maximum 8.44 mil-
lion Dth. Another output is compressor stations' total installed horsepower, an important
characteristic of gas transmission. Installed horsepower (Hp) is calculated as the product
of the number of stations and their certied horsepower. This enables us to incorporate a
capacity measurement. In fact, the data show signicant dierences in installed horsepower
ranging from a minimum of 9 million Hp to a maximum of nearly 1,435 million Hp. The
standard deviation of 371.72 million Hp indicates the strong variation in the data.
An additional output variable is transmission system losses. In total nearly 39.7 million
Dth of natural gas are lost that would not occur in total deliveries. Pipelines report data
ranging from no losses to 6,685 thousand Dth. A record of zero losses is technically very
unlikely. Therefore, we suspect measurement errors, which we try to overcome with the
subsequent outlier detection. TransLos must be treated dierently from the others because
of the inverse interpretation of undesirable outputs. To ensure a correct representation, we
translate this variable such that more losses are disadvantageous to companies' performance.
Thus, we subtract from a large number11 and choose 10,000,000 as the large number.12
3.3 Outlier detection based on super-eciency
Because nonparametric methods are sensitive to outliers (Simar 2003), we conduct an outlier
detection based on the concept of super-eciency. Following Banker and Chang (2006),
we choose the selection criterion of 1.2: companies achieving an eciency score equal to or
smaller than 1.2 are accepted for the sample and those exceeding this criterion are excluded
from further analysis. We nd that three of the 37 utilities are super-ecient: Columbia
Gas Transmission Corporation with 5.42, Petal Gas Storage, L.L.C. with 2.97, and Vector
Pipeline L.P. with 2.02. In addition, this outlier detection conrms doubts from reporting
non-transmission system losses for two of the three.13 Hence, our nal sample size is 34
pipelines.
8Petal Gas Storage, L.L.C. operates the smallest pipeline system, 59 miles, and Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Company operates the largest, 14,463 miles.
9Natural gas delivered does not only account for own sales but also for interactions with others.
10Natural gas delivered in peak times refers to single day peak deliveries summing deliveries to interstate
pipelines and \others".
11Other ways to implement undesirable outputs in the DEA framework are discussed in Dyson et al.
(2001).
12The results are insensitive to a variation of the large number to 8,000,000 instead.
13The other two of the four pipelines which report zero transmission losses do not determine the frontier
in the super-eciency analysis.
84 Results
This section presents our results.14 First, we deal with the results of the PCA, followed by
the eciency estimation for the two models (Model 1 without TransLos and Model 2 with
TransLos) and methodologies (DEA and PCA-DEA). We then discuss the results for our
model specications for a particular pipeline to illustrate the relevance of PCA-DEA for
real-world regulatory practice.
4.1 Principal components analysis
The principal components analysis enables us to reduce the dimensions of the linear program
and thus to increase discrimination between the pipelines of interest. Table 4 shows the
results of our separate PCA analysis for both models. In terms of output, the rst principal
component (PC1) captures at least 82% of data variation in both models. Considering also
PC2 results in a cumulative explanation of more than 95% in Model 1 and 90% in Model
2 of the total data variation. Using only these two output PCs does not cause much loss
of information for either Model 1 (4.73%) or Model 2 (9.47%). Since we consider only one
input PC, we capture all information. Hence, it exactly represents the single input and
does not aect eciency measurement.
4.2 Eciency of pipelines
Descriptive statistics of the pipelines' individual eciencies (by percentage) given by DEA
and PCA-DEA for each model are shown in Table 5. A company is fully ecient if it achieves
100%. The lower the eciency score the worse the company has performed relative to its
peers. We nd two general results. First, compared to the traditional DEA approach, PCA-
DEA yields lower eciency. For example, pipelines in Model 1 (without TransLos) achieve
66.89% on average but 46.54% under the PCA-DEA specication. This empirically reects
the argument of Adler and Yazhemsky (2009, p. 3) by which PCA-DEA has eects similar
to the imposition of weight restrictions, which renders parts of the ecient boundary of
the production possibility set no longer ecient. In other words, companies that are really
specialists in one of the original dimensions would be considered ecient performers due
to linear programming. In fact, only specialization in this particular dimension would lead
to eciency, whereas the overall performance of the aected company does not. The single
feature criterion (specialist in one dimension) is a particular problem for nonparametric
approaches, while the weights of the variables by the coecients attenuate the empirical
problem in parametric SFA frameworks (Riechmann and Rodgarkia-Dara 2006). This over-
estimation of eciency occurs especially when only a few observations are present relative
to the number of variables. By means of PCA-DEA we reduce the space to only two
dimensions and thus improve the eciency determination.
Second, comparing the particular specications of Model 1 with their counterparts in
Model 2 (including TransLos), we observe higher eciency in the latter model. This obser-
vation is almost true for every statistic, e.g., DEA specication in Model 1 reveals a mean
of 66.89% and 77.55% in Model 2, and PCA-DEA specication reveals a mean of 46.54% in
Model 1 and 60.04% in Model 2. We observe only one exception in the minimum eciency
14For calculations we use the PCA-DEA Program developed by Adler (http://pluto.huji.ac.il/
\~msnic/PCADEA.htm).
9scores of PCA-DEA specication. So far, both models appear to dier in some respects,
e.g., to median or 75%-quantile scores, which is highly relevant to regulatory practice. How-
ever, the robustness of PCA-DEA analysis is supported when considering pipeline-specic
eciency scores.
Figure 1 shows how company-specic eciency scores change with DEA and PCA-DEA,
and with our two model specications. In addition to the ndings already discussed|also
retraceable here|other noticeable ndings occur. In both graphs the pipelines are arranged
in increasing order of total deliveries (TotDeliv), indicating their size.
For DEA specication, none of the plots suggests an identiable trend of better perfor-
mance depending on pipelines' size. This can be explained by the VRS approach. However,
for PCA-DEA specication, the larger pipelines seem to be better performers. Intuitively,
the impact of single features, which make companies ecient in the range of smaller com-
panies when VRS technology is assumed, is attenuated.
The number of pipelines that are part of the eciency frontier is clearly higher when
DEA applies. In this case, Model 1 depicts seven ecient utilities, and Model 2 even de-
nes half of the sample as ecient due to the additional output variable TransLos. It is for
technical reasons that the more variables are included in traditional DEA, the more units
are considered to be ecient. This has particular importance in small samples. Moreover,
Adler and Yazhemsky (2009) show by means of Monte Carlo simulation, that a trade-o oc-
curs between incorrect classication of (in)ecient decision-making units under traditional
DEA and PCA-DEA. If technology and salient variables are correctly specied, traditional
DEA never denes truly ecient units incorrectly as inecient, i.e. the probability of error
type 1 is zero. But at the same time, the probability of incorrectly dening inecient units
as ecient (error type 2) is high in DEA under VRS. Thus, we can expect a remarkable pro-
portion of pipelines to be over-estimated in terms of eciency, and potential cost reduction
would remain uncovered. Therefore, the aim of regulation is not achieved.
While PCA-DEA can improve benchmarking activities while notably lowering the level
of over-estimation, there is a cost. PCA-DEA causes a certain level of under-estimation.
However, in radial eciency measurement, this eect is minor. Adler and Yazhemsky
(2009) demonstrate that with PCA-DEA the probability of under-estimation (error type 1)
is very small while the probability of over-estimation (error type 2) signicantly improves.
Empirically PCA-DEA in our analysis denes three (Model 1) and nine (Model 2) pipelines
as ecient. Note that in both cases only two PCs are included in the analysis and thus, the
ratio of variables and observations is acceptable. Hence, PCA-DEA oers methodological
features that are preferable to those of traditional DEA.
However, for both models we observe that most of the pipelines suer from introducing
PCA-DEA. In Model 1, the second-smallest pipeline delivering about 53 million Dth of
natural gas (MIGC, LLC) achieves 50.79% under the DEA specication and decreases
to 37.66% under PCA-DEA; a larger pipeline delivering 1,360 million Dth of natural gas
(Dominion Transmission, Inc.) achieves 69.84% under DEA and decreases to 58.22% under
PCA-DEA. But in Model 1 there are also companies that do not suer from introducing
PCA-DEA, i.e. those delivering 50 (Guardian Pipeline, LLC), 421 (IPOC as Agent/Iroquois
Gas Trans. Sys. LP), and 3,270 (Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation) million Dth.
We note that only peers (fully ecient companies) remain at the same level as before. It
seems that their respective eciency score is not distorted from unique characteristics15
15Riechmann and Rodgarkia-Dara (2006) point out that statistical fuzziness and unique characteristics
10and full eciency is justied.
According to Adler and Yazhemsky (2009, p. 10) it is preferable to avoid the omission
of relevant variables because it leads to under-estimation of the mean eciency. For regu-
latory practice including operating characteristics, quality variables, etc., in a sophisticated
model can be important. However, the request for a realistic representation of company
structures easily increases the number of variables substantially and hence, harms the ratio
between observations and variables. The known consequence is a deteriorated discrimina-
tion capability of DEA. In fact, including TransLos in place of the mentioned variables
yields signicantly changed eciency scores in both model specications of Model 2, i.e.
DEA and PCA-DEA. Still, the methodological dierence induces a reduction of dimensions
when PCA-DEA is applied; thus, using PCA-DEA does not aect the discriminatory ca-
pability although more variables are considered before. When we compare the PCA-DEA
results of Model 1 (without TransLos) and Model 2, 29% of the companies (10 out of 34)
exhibit lower eciency under Model 2. Other companies improve or remain as good as
before. The maximum individual worsening of 3.93% is experienced by the company deliv-
ering 100 million Dth in total (Equitrans LP). Note that because dimensions are equal in
both models, changes seem to be associated with new information. At the same time, the
PCA-DEA specication in Model 2 discloses the ability of PCA to account for specialists
which we explain by one specic pipeline in more detail in the following section.
4.3 Case Study: Northern Border Pipeline Company
Northern Border Pipeline Company delivers 907 million Dth in total and achieves very
low eciency scores in Model 1 (27.02% with DEA and 19.23% with PCA-DEA), but
the eciency scores increase signicantly when including TransLos in Model 2. Under
traditional DEA, the pipeline achieves 100% eciency. This indicates specialization in
the particular variable TransLos which accounts for roughly 78 thousand Dth (so it seems
unlikely to be an error in reporting). In contrast, when applying PCA-DEA, the eciency
score falls to 80.72%. What cannot be seen from this graph directly is how the reference set
of Northern Border Pipeline Company changes between Model 1 and Model 2 with respect
to PCA-DEA specication.
Table 6 provides more insight on the relevance of this reference set (peers) on the
eciency of our example. In Model 1 Northern Border Pipeline Company is compared to
the ecient utilities IPOC as Agent/Iroquois Gas Trans. Sys. LP and Transcontinental
Gas Pipeline Corporation, whereas in Model 2 Dominion Transmission, Inc. and El Paso
Natural Gas Company appear to be its peers.16 Obviously, IPOC as Agent/Iroquois Gas
Trans. Sys. LP is a much smaller company, e.g., OPEX are only 9.3 mn USD, and total
deliveries account for 420.6 mn Dth. Peers in the reference set of Model 2 are structurally
more alike than the peers in Model 1. This can also be observed in Figure 1, where in
Model 1 (PCA-DEA specication) the peers of Northern Border Pipeline Company are the
ecient companies delivering 421 and 3,270 mn Dth, and in Model 2 the peers are those
ecient pipelines delivering 1,360 and 6,047 mn Dth. This nding conrms the idea of
DEA in the regulatory context. Burns et al. (2005, p. 304) relate benchmarking techniques
are sources of distortion.
16The peers in Model 1 with DEA specication are Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation and
Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. In Model 2 with DEA specication Northern Border Pipeline Company serves as
the peer, because of its specialization.
11to yardstick competition and point out that one key feature of DEA is that it identies
\local" conditions, i.e. analyses the eciency of a rm with reference to other rms that
are similar in their combinations of outputs, for example. If regulators want benchmarking
to fulll this prerequisite, our results support its fulllment when relevant variables are part
of the analysis and discrimination power is given by applying PCA-DEA.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to empirically demonstrate how improving discriminatory
power in nonparametric eciency analysis aects the eciency scores of natural gas trans-
mission companies. Moreover, we desire to support a pragmatic approach of eciency
evaluation for (European) regulatory authorities that accounts for a poor ratio between the
number of variables and the number of observations.
Over the last decades network industries with natural monopoly character have expe-
rienced extensive restructuring towards incentive-based regulation schemes. Restructuring
aims to motivate more ecient production and cost structures. Benchmarking has be-
come an established tool in regulatory practice to identify company-individual targets for
achieving these goals. Although there is an increasing interest in parametric benchmarking
methods, e.g., SFA, practical experience show frequent application of nonparametric ap-
proaches such as DEA. For meaningful eciency measurement, DEA requires a sucient
amount of data. However, due to the former monopolistic market structures and yearly
conducted eciency evaluation, this cannot always be guaranteed in reality. Limited data
negatively aects DEA's discriminatory power, and thus increases the probability of e-
ciency over-estimation. This issue amplies when a large number of variables are considered
to describe the production process or cost structure of companies. To address this issue,
DEA can be combined with PCA. By means of linear combinations of the original variables
PCA reduces the dimensions while maintaining a large proportion of the variation in the
original data. Consequently, discriminatory power in PCA-DEA improves and results in
more robust eciency scores. If regulators want benchmarking to fulll this prerequisite,
our results support its fulllment when relevant variables are part of the analysis and dis-
crimination power is given, i.e. by applying PCA-DEA. We test our hypotheses by applying
PCA-DEA to a large sample of US natural gas transmission pipelines. We chose to employ
US data because it is publicly available and the industry has a signicant regulatory record.
We dened two models, one with four output variables and a second with ve; both models
had a single input.
Our results suggest that PCA-DEA improves nonparametric eciency analysis. Mod-
els applying traditional DEA display a high proportion of fully ecient pipelines (up to
50%), where we can suspect many are over-estimated. Because over-estimation decreases,
pipelines on average perform less well under PCA-DEA than under DEA, which we trace
back to more realistic eciency measurement. We then show that additional outputs sig-
nicantly change the results and, in PCA-DEA models, improve the evaluation of pipelines.
Eciency score changes between the dierent PCA-DEA model specications appear to be
not due to higher model dimensions, but due to worthwhile information and structurally
similar reference companies. We conclude that these ndings support current regulatory
practice by mitigating the conict between too few observations, and the demand for many
variables to produce an appropriate representation of the relevant structures.
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15Tables
Table 1: European regulated TSO natural gas companies
Country Number Country Number
Austria 7 Latvia 1
Belgium 1 Lithuania 1
Czech Republic 1 Luxembourg 1
Denmark 1 Netherlands 1
Estonia 1 Poland 1
Finland 1 Portugal 1
France 2 Romania 1
Germany 20 Slovakia 1
Greece 1 Slovenia 1
Hungary 1 Spain 8
Ireland 1 Sweden 3
Italy 2 UK 1
Source: Technical Annex to the Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament COM(2009)115.
Table 2: Model specication
Model 1 Model 2
DEA PCA-DEA DEA PCA-DEA
DEA X X
PCA-DEA X X
VRS X X X X
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of US natural gas transmission companies, onshore (2007)
Variable Opex Total Transmission Peak Installed Transmission
Deliveries System Deliveries Horsepower System Losses
Unit mn USD mn Dth Miles mn Dth thou Hp thou Dth
Sum 2,860.32 34,191.24 127,783.20 86.81 11,003.22 38,677.68
Minimum 1.25 49.93 59.00 0.19 9.00 0.00
Maximum 402.67 6,046.71 14,463.20 8.44 1,434.27 6,684
Mean 77.31 924.09 3,453.60 2.35 125.95 1,045.34
Median 31.50 403.89 1,680.40 1.68 297.38 615.66
Std. Dev. 99.61 1,255.53 3,703.33 2.12 371.72 1,399.32
Source: FERC Form No. 2.
16Table 4: Principal components analysis for Models 1 and 2
Variance explained by principal component in %
Model 1 Model 2
PC Input Output Input Output





Table 5: Eciency of US American natural gas transmission companies in %
Model 1 (without TransLos) Model 2 (with TransLos)
Statistic DEA PCA-DEA DEA PCA-DEA
Minimum 27.02 19.23 30.65 19.10
25%-quantile 44.78 31.46 53.83 39.52
Mean 66.89 46.54 77.55 60.04
Median 63.86 39.51 93.45 48.39
75%-quantile 95.53 57.08 100 98.50
Maximum 100 100 100 100
Table 6: Peers of Northern Border Pipeline Company in PCA-DEA model specications
Variable Opex TotDeliv TransSys PeakDeliv HorPow TransLos
Unit mn USD mn Dth Miles mn Dth thou Hp thou Dth
NBPC 165.3 907.0 1,399 2.6 536.6 77.9
Peers in Model 1
I/I 9.3 420.6 414 1.4 78.3 489.4
TGPC 117.3 3,270.0 10,325 8.4 1,434.3 6,684.6
Peers in Model 2
DTI 70.7 1,360.1 3,344 4.0 350.2 398.5
EPNGC 373.4 6,046.7 10,240 5.1 1,136.4 3,038.8
Notes: NBPC = Northern Border Pipeline Company, I/I = IPOC as Agent/Iroquois Gas Trans. Sys. L.P.,
TGPC = Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, DTI = Dominion Transmission, Inc.,
EPNGC = El Paso Natural Gas Company
Source: FERC Form No. 2.
17Figure 1: Pipeline-individual eciency of US American natural gas transmission companies
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